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Case Notes
GOLDRICH V NEW YORK STATE HIGHER
EDUCATION SER VICES CORP.: A NEW
BURDEN ON BANKRUPTCY'S
FRESH START
This Case Note examines the Second Circuit decision of Goldrich v. New York
State Higher Education Services Corporation, which permitted the state of New
York to require a student to reaffirm previously discharged student loans before the
state would guarantee further debt The case is seen as an anomaly to prior decisions
that have broadly construed the 'fresh start" policies inherent in section 525 of the
Bankruptcy Code which prohibits governmental units from discriminating against in-
dividuals because they have sought relief under the bankruptcy laws The author
concludes that GoIdrich moves far afield from the policies of the bankruptcy laws and
sets a dangerous precedent that may eventually be extended to debts other than stu-
dent loans.
INTRODUCTION
'4ONE OF THE primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to
[give honest debtors] a new opportunity in life and a clear field
for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement
of preexisting debt."'
Throughout history, the lives of debtors unable to meet their
obligations were spent at their creditors' whims with little or no
hope of economic independence. Roman debtors were subject to
incarceration in the creditor's house for sixty days without any duty
on the part of the creditor to feed the delinquent debtor.2 English
and early American debtors were jailed in debtor's prisons.3
Although these practices may have resulted in a curious sort of sat-
isfaction to the debtor's creditors, they also burdened the state with
1. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
2. Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The Debtor's
Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 427, 428-30 (1974) (tracing the treatment of debtors through-
out history and the development of the fresh start policy in the United States, including the
role of the discharge under the present day bankruptcy laws).
3. Note, Protection of a Debtor's "Fresh Start" Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 39
CATH. U.L. REV. 843, 846 (1980) (examining the impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 exemptions on a debtor's fresh start after bankruptcy). See generally The History of
Imprisonment for Debt and its Relation to the Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 29 U.
Chi. L. Sch. Rec. 5-12 (Fall 1983).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the expense of "maintaining the debtor-prisoner and his inevitably
destitute dependents." 4
In an attempt to avoid burdening the state, and recognizing that
debtors must be given incentive to become independent economic
entities after bankruptcy, one of the primary goals of the United
States' bankruptcy laws is granting a fresh start to debtors who have
had their obligations discharged in bankruptcy.' Fundamental to
the implementation of this policy is section 525 of the Bankruptcy
Code, which prohibits governmental units from discriminating
against individuals solely because they turned to the bankruptcy
laws for relief from their indebtedness. 6 The section's original pur-
4. Note, supra note 3, at 846.
5. See, eg., Harris v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447, 451 (1943)
(Bankruptcy Act provides a means of rehabilitating the debtor while leaving creditors "all for
which they can reasonably hope"); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. at 244-45 (primary
purpose of the Bankruptcy Act was to give honest debtors an opportunity to rid themselves of
obligations incurred through business misfortunes). The current bankruptcy laws are com-
posed of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 and the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
333 (1984) (codified at 11 U.S.C. (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Code]. The 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act was the first significant reform in the bankruptcy laws since 1898.
Among the previous bankruptcy laws were the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544
(1898) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Act], the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat.
517 (1867) (repealed 1878); the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed
1843); and the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed 1803). Prior to
1979, the "chapter proceedings" were governed by the Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52
Stat. 833 (repealed 1979). See Note, supra note 2, at 843 n.l.
6. Section 525 provides in pertinent part:
(a) ... [A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a
license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a grant
to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny employment to, termi-
nate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against, a per-
son that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or debtor under the
Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bankrupt or debtor has been
associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is or has been a debtor under this
title, or a bankrupt or debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, has been insolvent before
the commencement of the case under this title, or during the case but before the
debtor is granted or denied a discharge, or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable
in the case under this title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.
(b) No private employer may terminate the employment of, or discriminate with
respect to employment against, an individual who is or has been a debtor under this
title, a debtor or bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act, or an individual associated
with such debtor or bankrupt, solely because such debtor or bankrupt-
(1) is or has been a debtor under this title or a debtor or bankrupt under the
Bankruptcy Act;
(2) has been insolvent before the commencement of a case under this title or
during the case but before the grant or denial of a discharge; or
(3) has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this title or that
was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.
11 U.S.C. § 525 (1982 & Supp. I 1984). Subsection (b) prohibiting private employers from
discriminating against bankrupts was added as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-353, 97 Stat. 333 (1984).
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pose was to codify the result in Perez v. Campbell7 and to
strengthen the anti-reaffirmation policies of section 524 of the
Code.8
In the past, the Code's antidiscrimination and anti-reaffirmation
provisions have been broadly applied to invalidate a wide range of
state activities.9 In Goldrich v. New York State Higher Education
Services Corp. (In re Goldrich),10 however, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals contradicted that trend by holding that section 525 does
not prohibit creditors from refusing to extend credit to an individ-
ual whose prior debt has been discharged in bankruptcy."
The immediate effect of Goldrich was to allow New York state
to require a student whose loans had been discharged in bankruptcy
to reaffirm those debts prior to reviewing the individual's applica-
tion for subsequent loan guarantees. 2 More broadly, the Goldrich
decision establishes a precedent which could seriously infringe upon
a debtor's fresh start. The narrow construction of section 525 es-
poused by the court in Goldrich may pose serious obstacles for debt-
ors trying to obtain credit, a prerequisite to a fresh start.
Significantly, the Goldrich principle may not be limited to student
loans, but may also be applied in the context of businesses applying
for credit during reorganization or to any credit or financing ar-
rangement where the applicant has previously had debts discharged
in bankruptcy.
7. 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (state prohibited from using its power to compel post-discharge
debt satisfaction counteracting discharge benefits). See infra notes 35-65 and accompanying
text.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Section 524(a) prohibits creditors from
using threats and other harrassments to collect discharged debts. In contrast to section 525,
section 524 applies to private individuals as well as public entities. Both sections are intended
to prevent discriminatory or coercive treatment of debtors who have received discharges. See
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 525.03 (15th ed. 1985). Furthermore, section 524 outlines
strict procedures which courts must follow before permitting a debtor to voluntarily reaffirm
a debt which has been discharged. See id. § 524.02-04. See infra notes 36-45 and accompa-
nying text for legislative history on 11 U.S.C. § 525.
9. See generally H. MILLER & M. COOK, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE BANKRUPTCY
REFORM ACT 414 (1979) (discussing the broad construction given section 525 by the courts
and predicting that a wide range of governmental activities will be struck down). For a
review of some of the governmental practices which have already been abolished, see infra
notes 66-112 and accompanying text.
10. 45 Bankr. 514 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985).
11. Goldrich, 771 F.2d at 29-32. See infra notes 14-34 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Second Circuit's opinion.
12. See generally Bankrupt Loses Bid for Second Student Loan, 194 N.Y.LJ., Aug. 27,
1985, at 1, col.2.
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I. THE GOLDRICH DECISION
A. Factual Background
In 1969, Goldrich obtained a student loan which was guaran-
teed by the New York State Higher Education Services Corporation
(NYSHESC) 3 In 1971, Goldrich defaulted on the loan, forcing
the NYSHESC to pay the full amount of the loan to the issuing
bank.14
In 1978, NYSHESC obtained a judgment against Goldrich in
the amount of the guaranteed loan. Two years later, Goldrich peti-
tioned for a voluntary bankruptcy under Title 11, scheduling the
unpaid student loan as one of his debts.15 In 1981, Goldrich re-
ceived a discharge from his dischargeable debts, which included the
student loan.16 Prior to and after receiving his discharge, Goldrich
attempted to obtain additional student loans. Although his applica-
tions were accepted by various New York banks, NYSHESC re-
fused to consider his applications for additional loan guarantees on
the ground that they were prevented from doing so under section
616(6)(b) of the New York Education Law. That statute provides
that "[a]ny student who is in default in the repayment of any stu-
dent loan, the payment of which has been guaranteed by the corpo-
ration... shall not be eligible for any... student loan so long as
such default status or failure to comply continues."17
B. The Bankruptcy Court's Decision
In 1983, Goldrich petitioned the bankruptcy court for injunctive
and monetary relief against the state due to its refusal to consider
his loan application. 8 The bankruptcy court granted this relief. 9
Subsequently, Goldrich filed a complaint in which he challenged
13. Goldrich, 45 Bankr. at 514. NYSHESC is authorized to guarantee loans and admin-
ister state financial aid programs for eligible students. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 561 (McKinney
Supp. 1984).
14. Goldrich, 45 Bankr. at 516.
15. Id.
16. Currently, educational loans which are provided, insured, or guaranteed by a gov-
ernmental unit, are nondischargeable. Exceptions to nondischargeability are available if the
loan first becomes due at least five years prior to filing a bankruptcy petition or if undue
hardship to the debtor or his dependents would result. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1982 & Supp.
I 1984). It is interesting to note that, beginning in 1985, the Internal Revenue Service will be
withholding tax refunds of people who have defaulted on government loans. This includes
656,894 students who failed to repay $1.3 billion in loans. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1986, at
1, col. 2.
17. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 661(6)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1984).
18. Id.
19. Goldrich, 45 Bankr. at 515.
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the constitutionality of the state's loan denial pursuant to section
661(6)(b). 2" The bankruptcy court held that section 661(6)(b) un-
constitutionally discriminated against former bankrupts by condi-
tioning the award of student loans on the payment of discharged
debts.2 '
Relying on Perez v. Cambell,22 the legislative history of section
525,23 and previous decisions interpreting that section,24 the bank-
ruptcy court found that extensions of credit fall within the scope of
section 525's mandate against discriminatory treatment.2' Further-
more, the bankruptcy court ruled that section 661(6)(b) was uncon-
stitutional because it frustrated the underlying policies of the federal
bankruptcy laws by "denying [a former bankrupt] the means avail-
able to other citizens to acquire a higher education.
26
C. The Appellate Court Reversal
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the bankruptcy
court's broad application of section 525 because it found a loan
guarantee to be dissimilar to any of the enumerated grants con-
tained in section 525.27 Section 525 provides in pertinent part:
[A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse
to renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar
grant to, condition such a grant to, discriminate with respect to
such a grant against ... a person that is or has been a debtor
under this title ... solely because such bankrupt or debtor is or
has been a debtor under this title ... has been insolvent before
the commencement of the case under this title, or during the case
but before the debtor is granted or denied a discharge, or has not
paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case under this title.28
20. Id.
21. Id. at 516. Goldrich alleged that denial of the loan guarantee violated 11 U.S.C.
§ 525 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) and the federal supremacy doctrine enunciated in Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971). See infra notes 27, 36-64 and accompanying text.
22. Goldrich, 45 Bankr. at 519-23.
23. 402 U.S. 637. See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
25. The bankruptcy court relied on several cases as the foundation for its conclusion
that section 525 was to be broadly construed. Among those cases were Rose v. Connecticut
Housing Fin. Auth. (In re Rose), 23 Bankr. 662 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982) (discussed infra
notes 101-06 and accompanying text); In re Richardson, 15 Bankr. 952 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1982) rev'd, 27 Bankr. 560 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (discussed infra notes 116-24 and accom-
panying text); and Marine Elec. Ry. Prods. Div. v. New York City Transit Auth. (In re
Marine Elec. Ry. Prods. Div.), 17 Bankr. 845 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982) (discussed infra notes
91-100 and accompanying text).
26. Goldrich, 45 Bankr. at 520-23.
27. Id. at 523.
28. Goldrich, 771 F.2d at 29-31.
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Adopting a restrictive interpretation of section 525, the court
held that a credit guarantee does not fall within the section's scope
because it is not a "license, permit, charter, franchise, or other simi-
lar grant. '29 Reluctant to probe beyond the plain language of the
statute, the court asserted that, "[A]lthough the exact scope of the
items enumerated [in section 525] may be undefined, the fact that
the list is composed solely of benefits conferred by the state that are
unrelated to credit is unambiguous. '3' Applying the rule of ejus-
dem generis31 to the phrase "other similar grant," the court held
that applications for credit do not fall within the scope of section
525's protections.32
The appellate court in Goldrich also found that section 661(6)(b)
did not conflict with the Bankruptcy Code because the state law
was "not intended to coerce payment of defaulted student loans."'33
Rather, the court found that the New York law was designed to
serve the permissible state purpose of "protect[ing] the state coffers
against repeated default.",34
In addition to finding that the legislation served a legitimate
state purpose, the court found that the state had not applied section
661(6)(b) in a discriminatory fashion. The language of section
661(6)(b) indicated that the section pertained to all students who
failed to repay student loans, whether or not they declare bank-
29. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
30. Goldrich, 771 F.2d at 30.
31. Id. The court concluded that "[i]n the absence of ambiguity," no further analysis
was necessary. Id. (citations omitted). Since, however, the bankruptcy court relied on the
legislative history of section 525 in reaching its decision, the appellate court felt compelled to
provide further justification for its narrow interpretation of the statute. In continuing its
analysis, the court focused on a statement from the Senate Report which accompanied section
525:
This section permits further development to prohibit actions by governmental or
quasi-governmental organizations that perform licensing functions, such as a State
bar association or a medical society, or by other organizations that can seriously
affect the debtors' livelihood or fresh start, such as exclusion from a union on the
basis of discharge of a debt to the union's credit union.
Id. at 30 (quoting S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 81, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5867). See infra note 34 and accompanying text. The court
ultimately justified its decision on the grounds that the "extension of credit [was] manifestly
different from both examples given in the Senate Report: licensing and exclusion from a
union." Goldrich, 771 F.2d at 31.
32. The doctrine of ejusdem generis requires that "[w]here general words follow specific
words in an enumeration describing the legal subject, the general words are construed to
embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific
words." Rose v. Connecticut Housing Fin. Auth. (In re Rose), 23 Bankr. 662, 666 n.6
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1982) (citations omitted).
33. Goldrich, 771 F.2d at 31.
34. Id.
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ruptcy; therefore, since bankrupt and non-bankrupt loan defaulters
were treated identically, the court concluded that the statute was
not discriminatory on its face or in its application.35 It should be
noted, however, that by restricting its analysis to the plain language
of the statute despite the expressed legislative intent that the courts
were to continue developing the Perez rule,3 6 the court in Goldrich
failed to consider whether the effect of the state action conflicted
with the underlying policies of the federal bankruptcy laws.
II. SECTION 525's PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATORY
TREATMENT
Facially, section 525 does not encompass the denial of credit or
financing. In fact, as one expert in the field has noted:
The prohibition against discriminatory treatment does not affect
decisions to grant credit to the debtor since future financial re-
sponsibility may be taken into account by a creditor. It had been
feared that discriminatory treatment might be interpreted to in-
clude the granting of credit. However, consideration of a past dis-
charge in determining whether to grant the debtor credit does not
violate the Code to the extent that the decision is made by a non-
governmental entity, or is based on purely economic criteria, such
as future financial responsibility.37
On the other hand, section 525's legislative history clearly indi-
cates that Congress did not intend to enumerate all of the forms of
discrimination by government organizations which conflict with the
policies of the bankruptcy laws. Both the Senate and House Com-
mittee Reports which accompanied section 525 indicate that Con-
gress intended that the courts expand upon the enumerated forms
of discrimination and continue developing the Perez rule.3"
[T]he section is not exhaustive. The enumeration of various
forms of discrimination against former bankrupts is not intended
to permit other forms of discrimination. The courts have been
developing the Perez rule. This section permits further develop-
35. Id
36. Id
37. Id The Senate Committee Report accompanying the legislation which became sec-
tion 525 stated,
The section is not exhaustive. The enumeration of various forms of discrimination
against former bankrupts is not intended to permit other forms of discrimination.
The courts have been developing the Perez rule. This section permits further devel-
opment to prohibit actions by governmental or quasi-governmental organizations
that... can seriously affect the debtors' livelihood or fresh start....
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 81, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5787, 5867 [hereinafter cited as S. REP.]. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
38. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 8, § 525.02 (emphasis added).
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ment to prohibit actions by governmental or quasi-governmental
organizations... that can seriously affect the debtor's livelihood
or fresh start ....
Congress also declared that the effect of section 525 and further
judicial enunciations of the Perez doctrine should strengthen the
anti-reaffirmation policy of section 524(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code." Discrimination which results solely from nonpayment of
discharged debts runs counter to section 524's expressed policy of
protecting the debtor's discharge.41
An examination of section 525's legislative history reveals that
Congress sought to limit the application of the antidiscrimination
provision to government actions which discriminate solely on the
basis of bankruptcy.42 Congress emphasized that the prohibition
does not prevent the examination of factors leading to the bank-
ruptcy or of prospective financial or managerial ability.43 Bank-
rupts may also be subject to nondiscriminatory "requirements such
as net capital rules"'  or "financial responsibility rules.")45
The overriding objective of section 525 is to "prevent an auto-
matic reaction against an individual for availing himself of the pro-
tection of the bankruptcy laws"46 and to prohibit all discrimination
of the character condemned in Perez. Even so, a state may impose
regulations which fall short of coercing payment, so long as they do
not conflict with the bankruptcy laws. 7 An examination of Perez
4 8
provides some indication of the scope of this permissive regulation.
39. S. REP., supra note 37, at 5967; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 165, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6126 [hereinafter cited as H. REP.].
40. S. REP., supra note 37, at 5867.
41. Id. See also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 8 and accompanying text (dis-
cussion of 11 U.S.C. § 524(b) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).
42. S. REP., supra note 37, at 5867.
43. Id.
44. H. REP., supra note 39, at 6126.
45. S. REP., supra note 37, at 5867.
46. H. REP., supra note 39, at 6126, quoted in Duffey v. Dollison, 734 F.2d 265, 273 (6th
Cir. 1984) (upholding Ohio's "imposition of financial responsibility requirements, so long as
they are not discriminately applied to bankrupts."). See infra notes 125-32 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Duffey).
47. H. REP., supra note 39, at 6126. The policy is based on Congress' belief that,
"[m]ost bankruptcies are caused by circumstances beyond the debtor's control. To penalize a
debtor by discriminatory treatment as a result is unfair and undoes the beneficial effects of the
bankruptcy laws." Id. (footnote omitted).
48. See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text. See also Note, Supremacy of the
Bankruptcy Act: The New Standard ofPerez v. Campbell, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 764, 771-
72 n.51 (1972). The main test appears to be whether the state actions coerce bankrupts into
making payment on their discharged debts by "leaving no real choice but to pay his judgment
creditor." Id.
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III. THE SUPREMACY OF THE DEBTOR'S FRESH START: THE
PEREZ DECISION
In Perez v. Campbell,49 the Supreme Court struck down a sec-
tion of Arizona's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act which
required the suspension of a judgment debtor's driver's license if a
tort judgment arising out of an automobile accident remained un-
paid for sixty days.50 The Court held that the Arizona statute frus-
trated operation of the Bankruptcy Act and was therefore invalid
under the supremacy clause of the Constitution.51 In so holding,
the Court adopted a new test for determining whether a state law
impermissively conflicts with the discharge and anti-reaffirmation
policies of the bankruptcy laws.52
Relying on the rule in supremacy clause cases drawn from Hines
v. Davidowitz, 3 the Court in Perez ruled that the function of its
analysis should be to determine whether the Arizona statute stood
as "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress."54 If so, the state law must be
found to be invalid.55 Such a determination "is essentially a two-
step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes
and then determining the constitutional question [of] whether they
are in conflict."56 In its analysis, the Court determined that the
principle purpose of the Arizona statute was "the protection of the
public using the highways from financial hardship which may result
from the use of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons. '57
The Court determined, however, that the effect of the state Act was
to provide creditors with leverage to collect tort debts even though
the debts had been discharged in bankruptcy.5 "
49. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
50. 9 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1162 (1956) (repealed 1983).
51. Perez, 402 U.S. at 652. The governing principle of the supremacy clause, U.S.
CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2, is that" 'acts of the State Legislatures... [which] interfere with, or are
contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution,' are invalid under
the Supremacy Clause." Perez, 402 U.S. at 649 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (I
Wheat.) I, 92 (1824)). See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (state statutes
which stand as "obstacle[s] to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress" must be struck down).
52. For a discussion of the Perez decision, the limits of the rule, and imposing conse-
quences on bankrupts, see generally Note, supra note 48.
53. 312 U.S. 52 (1941). See supra note 51.
54. Perez, 402 U.S. at 649 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).
55. Id. at 644.
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 280, 380 P.2d 136, 140 (1963)).
58. Perez, 402 U.S. at 646-47.
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Contrasting the goals of the federal bankruptcy laws with the
policies underlying the state law, the Court noted that the Bank-
ruptcy Act seeks to give debtors a "new opportunity in life and a
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and dis-
couragement of preexisting debt,"' 59 including discharged tort judg-
ments. 60 As a result, the Court held that the Arizona statute was
unconstitutional because it had the effect of frustrating the fresh
start policy of the bankruptcy laws. The Court's conclusion di-
rectly conflicted with other courts' conclusions regarding similar
legislation. Specifically, Utah and New York courts had used a test
which focused on the purpose of the state legislation, rather than its
effect, to uphold automotive financial responsibility acts similar to
Arizona's because the purpose of the state legislation had not been
to "circumvent the Bankruptcy Act but to promote highway
safety."' 61 Criticizing these earlier cases, the Court in Perez stressed
that the "plain and inevitable effect" of the Utah and New York
laws was to "create a powerful weapon for collection of a debt from
which [the] bankrupt [had] been released by federal law."62 Char-
acterizing such a result as "aberrational," the Court held that it
could no longer adhere to a doctrine whereby a state could frustrate
operation of federal law simply because the state's law promoted a
legitimate state purpose.63
Perez clearly indicates that a state cannot "deprive a bankrupt of
the benefits of a discharge by later utilizing its power to obtain pay-
ment of the bankrupt's debts."'  In other words, regardless of a
state law's purported purpose, it will be found to be invalid if its
effect frustrates the objectives of the bankruptcy laws.65
59. Id. at 648 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
60. Id. ("There can be no doubt... that Congress intended this 'new opportunity' to
include freedom from most kinds of pre-existing tort judgments.").
61. Id. at 650. In two earlier cases, Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153
(1962), and Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941), the Supreme Court upheld Utah's and New
York's financial responsibility laws despite the fact that they admittedly left the "bankrupt to
some extent burdened by the discharged debt," since the Court did not look to the effect of
the state legislation, but rather to the purpose of the statutes which were said not to "aid
collection of debts but to enforce a policy against irresponsible driving." Kesler, 369 U.S. at
169. See also the Supreme Court's discussion of these cases in Perez, 402 U.S. at 650-54.
62. Perez, 402 U.S. at 650 (quoting Kesler, 369 U.S. at 183) (Black, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added).
63. Id. at 65 1. The Court went on to find that the stated purpose of the Arizona statute,
as expressed in Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963), would be imper-
missible even under the purpose test of Kesler and Reitz. Perez, 402 U.S. at 652-54. See also
Note, supra note 48, at 771 n.49.
64. Note, supra note 48, at 771.
65. Perez, 402 U.S. at 648-49.
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Perez also reaffirms the view that the bankruptcy laws are
designed to insure that debtors receive a fresh start, free from the
burdens of past obligations. Perez dictates that the bankruptcy
law's "fresh start" objective is to be employed in conjunction with
the supremacy clause on a case-by-case basis to invalidate acts by
states which frustrate the purposes and objectives of the bankruptcy
laws and to actualize Congress' intent to provide debtors with a
chance to recover from financial disaster.6
IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PEREZ RULE AND THE SCOPE
OF SECTION 525
Since Perez and its codification in section 525, the courts have
continued to develop the parameters of the antidiscrimination pro-
visions and have invalidated a wide range of acts by governmental
and quasi-governmental agencies. Such invalidated practices in-
elude discrimination in the form of universities withholding stu-
dent transcripts,67 as well as discrimination in the letting of public
contracts, 68 mortgage financing, 69 and eviction.70 Section 525 has
been applied to chapter 13 reorganization cases, 71 as well as to
"straight liquidations" under chapter 11.
Some of the state actions which have been struck down have
fallen within the "plain language" of the statute, but many have
not.72 No case prior to Goldrich has construed the statute as nar-
rowly as the Second Circuit has. The Goldrich court refused to ad-
dress prior precedent involving actions beyond the "plain language"
of the statute.73
An examination of some of the cases where section 525 has been
applied demonstrates the Goldrich court's inability to grasp the un-
66. Id. See also Comment, Student Loans and the Withholding of Transcripts Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 30 U. KAN. L. REv. 265, 276 (1982) (discussing fresh start
policy of Perez in conjunction with private and state university discrimination and attempts
by these institutions to collect on defaulted loans by withholding transcripts).
67. See infra notes 73-90 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
71. See, eg., In re Heath, 3 Bankr. 351 (Bankr. D. Ill. 1980) (discussed infra notes 77-80
and accompanying text).
72. For examples of instances in which the state action at issue did not fall within the
plain language of section 525, see infra notes 73-112 and accompanying text. See also Gol-
drich, 771 F.2d at 31 n.1, where the court stated that, since credit applications did not fall
within the "plain language" of the statute, it felt no need to reconcile its reasoning with other
cited cases which had concluded that section 525 should be broadly construed.
73. See Goldrich, 771 F.2d 28.
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derlying objectives of Perez. This failure caused the court to render
an opinion which not only conflicts with precedent, but also under-
cuts Congress' objectives in codifying Perez in section 525.
A. The Transcript Cases
Universities have often been accused of discriminating against
debtors by withholding the academic transcripts of students whose
loans have been discharged in bankruptcy. In the leading pre-Code
case of Handsome v. Rutgers University,74 a state university with-
held the transcript and refused to permit registration of a student
whose student loans had been discharged in bankruptcy." Invali-
dating the university's actions under Perez, the supremacy clause,
and the fourteenth amendment, the Handsome court held that the
university's actions were designed to serve its own ends as a credi-
tor, thereby encouraging reaffirmation of discharged loans.7 6 These
ends impermissibly transgressed upon the fresh start policy of the
bankruptcy laws. The court ordered the University to turn over the
student's transcript and permit her to register and permanently en-
joined further use of such practices. 7
In In re Heath,7 8 the bankruptcy court extended the principles
enunciated in Handsome, ruling that section 525 prohibited a state
college from withholding the transcript of a debtor whose prepeti-
tion student loans had been scheduled as part of his chapter 13 re-
74. 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1978). See also Lee v. Board of Higher Educ., 1 Bankr.
781 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1979) (economic consequences of depriving former student of tran-
script are severe and infringe on debtor's fresh start by perpetuating inability to keep current
with debts).
75. The facts of Handsome were compelling. The plaintiff attended a division of
Rutgers University from 1968 to 1974. During that time, she borrowed $4,600 in the form of
National Defense Student Loans and National Direct Student Loans. Subsequently, she suf-
fered severe health problems, incurred large medical bills, and in 1975, she was forced to
withdraw from school. After withdrawal, her student loans became due, but she was unable
to pay them as a result of her medical bills. In 1977, she filed a bankruptcy petition. Her
student loans were part of over $25,000 in liabilities, most of which were medical expenses.
At the same time, her total net worth was $368.85. Handsome, 445 F. Supp. at 1363.
In 1977, she received a discharge of her loans without objection from Rutgers University.
Later that year, she applied for readmission to Rutgers. The admissions committee informed
her that, while she had been readmitted, Rutger's policy was to "place hold" notices upon the
records of students more than three months delinquent in their debts to the university; there-
fore, she was precluded from registering and the university would not release her official
transcripts. Id. at 1363-64.
76. Id. at 1367. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
court's equal protection analysis.
77. Handsome, 445 F. Supp. at 1367. For a general discussion of the transcript cases,
see Comment, supra note 66.
78. In re Heath, 3 Bankr. 351 (Bankr. D. Ill. 1980).
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habilitation plan.7 9  The Heath court rejected the school's
contention that section 525 applies only after a debtor has received
a discharge, stating it would be "anomalous to grant a debtor pro-
tection from discriminatory actions in a liquidation proceeding and
deny him the same protection in a rehabilitation (chapter 13)
proceeding."80
The Heath court reasoned that the debtor's ability to fulfill his
obligations under a composition plan largely depends upon his abil-
ity to obtain employment, which in turn requires access to his tran-
script." In a similar case, Howrev v. Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama,82 the court went one step further, holding
that a state university cannot withhold a debtor's transcript for the
sole purpose of compelling him to repay student loans, even if the
dischargeability of such loans has not been finally determined.13
The most recent transcript case Johnson v. Edinboro State Col-
lege,84 held, however, that a state educational institution is not re-
quired to turn over a student's transcript where that student has
failed to repay nondischargeable student loans. While concurring
with the result in the previous transcript cases, 85 the court in John-
son refused to expand the applicability of section 525 to nondis-
chargeable debts. Thus, though the courts have broadly construed
section 525 in the student transcript context, there are at least a few
instances in which courts have restricted its applications.
8 6
79. The court had approved a 10% composition plan for Heath under which he could be
discharged from his remaining debts once he satisfied the plan's conditions. Despite the
court's approval of Heath's composition plan, the University refused to release his transcript
until his prepetition debt to the school was paid. In holding that the University's actions
were unconstitutional, the court noted that the University had not filed an objection to the
confirmation plan alleging that it was not "proposed in good faith" prior to its approval by
the court. Therefore, the court ruled that the University had no basis for demanding full
payment of the loans. Id. at 351-52. See also In re Resse, 38 Bankr. 681 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1984) (state university prohibited from retaining transcript of debtor undergoing chapter 13
reorganization prior to debtor's having obtained a discharge).
80. Heath, 3 Bankr. at 354.
81. Id The University argued that application of Perez should be limited to chapter 7.
The court held, however, that the Perez ruling was not limited to chapter 7 liquidation pro-
ceedings; rather, it was intended to prevent any discriminatory action which "tends to frus-
trate Bankruptcy policy as a whole," including "Congress's intent to allow debtors to
proceed, subsequent to Bankruptcy, unhampered by preexisting debts." Id (citations
omitted).
82. 10 Bankr. 303 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
83. The court specified, however, that, while a debtor need not have been granted a
discharge, bankruptcy proceedings must be initiated for section 525 to apply. Id. at 305.
84. 728 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984).
85. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
86. Similarly, courts have consistently refused to extend application of section 525 to
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Equal protection arguments have also been utilized to strike
down state university actions which discriminate against bankrupts.
In Handsome,"7 the court held that the Rutgers University classifi-
cation which included "all persons more than three months delin-
quent in their debts to the school," insofar as it included bankrupts,
"ran afoul of the equal protection clause."88 The court acknowl-
edged that education is not a fundamental right89 and that, there-
fore, the state need only show that the classification at issue is
"reasonably related to a legitimate government interest." 90 Never-
theless, the court concluded:
[A] state cannot claim a legitimate interest in securing the repay-
ment of loans discharged in bankruptcy. ... [A] citizen's status
as a bankrupt is perforce, an impermissible criterion. That is not
to say that [a university] may not in the future validly decline to
extend credit to one who has previously discharged his debts in
bankruptcy, but it cannot deny a citizen so vital a privilege as an
education on the basis of his status as a bankrupt.
B. Public Letting of Contracts
Section 525's antidiscrimination provisions have been inter-
preted broadly enough to prohibit discrimination in the context of
the letting of public contracts. In Marine Electric Railway Products
Division v. New York City Transit Authority (In re Marine Electric
Railway Products Division),92 the court held that the New York
cases involving private educational institutions. See Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d
1267 (8th Cir. 1977) (private institution may withhold transcripts to coerce repayment of
debts discharged in bankruptcy). See also In re Coachlight Dinner Theater, 8 Bankr. 656
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (radio station is a private entity, not a governmental unit under
section 525 and can, therefore, refuse to accept advertising of a debtor in chapter 11); In re
Northern Energy Prod., 7 Bankr. 473 (Bankr. Minn. 1980) (section 525 not applicable to
discrimination by Better Business Bureau of Minnesota since it is a private corporation).
87. 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1978).
88. Id. at 1367.
89. Id. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education not a
fundamental right or a suspect classification).
90. Handsome, 445 F. Supp. at 1367. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (where a
fundamental right not at issue, a state need only show that the classification is reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental purpose).
91. Handsome, 445 F. Supp. at 1367 (emphasis added). See also Lee v. Board of Higher
Educ., 1 Bankr. 781, 788-89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1979) (underlying goal of denying transcripts
to adjudicated bankrupts is collection of discharged debts, a state interest which deprives
those students whose loans have been discharged of their right to equal protection). It has
also been suggested that a separate cause of action for violations of section 525 may exist
under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). See B.
WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 3.06 at 3-29 n.19 (rev. ed.
1986).
92. 17 Bankr. 845 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982). See also In re Coleman Am. Moving Servs.,
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City Transit Authority (NYCTA) could not reject a debtor's bid on
a public contract solely on the ground that the debtor was a chapter
11 debtor in possession.93 The NYCTA contended that section 525
specifically enumerates activities in which governmental units can-
not discriminate and noted that the letting of public contracts was
not included.94 Emphasizing that "the legislative history of section
525 indicates that Congress sought to broadly attack discriminatory
practices by governmental entities,"95 the court rejected the
NYCTA's argument and instead applied the Perez test, weighing
the effect of the suspected governmental activities against the pur-
poses of the bankruptcy laws.96
The court recognized that a primary purpose of the bankruptcy
laws is to "'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obliga-
tions and responsibilities consequent upon business misfor-
tunes.' " Asserting that enabling a debtor to rehabilitate itself
through either individual or corporate reorganization furthered this
fresh start policy,98 the Marine Electric court noted that the
debtor's ability to compete against financially sound individuals and
businesses on an equal level is essential to a reorganization debtor's
successful rehabilitation. 99
The NYCTA tried to justify its actions by arguing that the con-
tract was too important to risk its letting to a contractor who might
end up in a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding.1"0 Despite the valid-
ity of this concern, the court held that it did not "outweigh the vital
8 Bankr. 379 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) (discrimination based solely on government contract
bidder's being in chapter 11 prohibited).
93. Marine Elec., 17 Bankr. at 853. The code's rehabilitation provisions (chapters 11
and 13) differ from bankruptcy liquidation proceedings in that, in a rehabilitation proceeding,
creditors look to the bankrupt's future earnings rather than taking his property to satisfy
their claims. In order to be successfully rehabilitated, the debtor is allowed to keep the assets
he needs to run his business. Such a debtor is known as a debtor in possession.
94. Marine Elec., 17 Bankr. at 853.
95. Id See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative
history of section 525.
96. Marine Elec., 17 Bankr. at 852. See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Perez test. See also Grimes v. Hoschler, 12 Cal. 3d 305, 525 P.2d 65, 115
Cal. Rptr. 625 (1974); Rutledge v. City of Shreveport, 387 F. Supp. 1277, 1279 (N.D. La.
1975) ("Two-step test" applied to hold that municipality could not discriminate against for-
mer bankrupt).
97. Marine Elec., 17 Bankr. at 853 (quoting Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)).
98. Id. at 853. See supra note 93 for a discussion of the policies underlying
reorganization.
99. Marine Elea, 17 Bankr. at 853.
100. Id NYCTA sought to justify its rejection of the plaintiff's bid on the ground that,
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rehabilitative purposes embodied in chapter 11 and in the Code as a
whole."' 1 1 Discrimination based solely on the debtor's status as a
bankrupt was found, therefore, to violate section 525.
C. Mortgage Financing and Wrongful Eviction
In Rose v. Connecticut Housing Finance Authority (In re
Rose),102 a former bankrupt charged that the Connecticut Housing
Finance Authority's (CHFA) refusal to approve his application for
a state-funded home mortgage violated section 525 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.' °3 The CHFA argued, however, that the denial of a
mortgage loan was not a transaction which fell within the explicit
language of section 525 since it was not a "license, permit, charter,
franchise or other similar grant."' 01 4
Rejecting the CHFA's argument that the plain language of the
statute and ejusdem generis doctrinel0 5 precluded application of sec-
tion 525 to mortgage financing, the bankruptcy court concluded:
If a state has chosen to enact a program of home financing for its
citizens, section 525 prohibits that state from exempting debtors or
bankrupts from those benefits solely because of bankruptcy and
without taking into account present financial capability. To hold
to the contrary would frustrate the Congressional policy of
granting the debtor a fresh start by denying him a means open to
other citizens of acquiring a home. 10 6
While the Rose court ultimately found that Rose had not been
denied financing solely because of his previous bankruptcy, 0 7 their
analysis indicates that the court assumed that section 525 applied to
mortgage financing. This is true even though mortgage financing is
not one of the enumerated grants in section 525. It should be noted
that Rose reaffirms the idea that section 525 does not prevent exami-
once work on the contract had begun, a substitute contractor could not easily take over if
Marine ended up in liquidation. Id.
101. Id.
102. 23 Bankr. 662 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982).
103. In 1977, Rose had discharged unpaid student loans in a bankruptcy liquidation pro-
ceeding. The Housing Authority asked Rose to reaffirm those loans prior to granting him
home financing. Id. at 663-65.
104. Id. at 665.
105. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
106. Rose, 23 Bankr. at 666-67 (emphasis added).
107. Members of the CHFA testified that Rose was found to be "not creditworthy" be-
cause he had only $108.00 in cash, had no other significant assets, had overdrawn his check-
ing account eight times in the year prior to his application, owed a credit union $1350.00,
needed a second mortgage for the balance of the purchase price on the house, and had no way
to pay the closing costs. Based upon this evidence, the court could not find that Rose was
denied financing solely on account of his prior bankruptcy. Id. at 667-68.
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nation of the circumstances surrounding the bankruptcy or the
debtor's present creditworthiness prior to a government agency's
decision to grant or deny financing.
In Gibbs v. Housing Authority (In re Gibbs),10 8 the Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Connecticut held that section 525 could be
used to prevent a city housing authority from evicting a debtor
whose debts had been discharged in a chapter 7 proceeding. The
agency which rented housing to persons under a state-aided pro-
gram for moderate income families threatened to evict Gibbs unless
she renewed a discharged debt of $74.00 owed to the agency. 0 9
Like the defendants in many similar cases, the Housing Author-
ity noted that the word "lease" was omitted from section 525 and
claimed that this was an indication of Congress' intention "not [to]
regulate the leasing practices of local public housing authorities."' 110
Relying on the congressional belief that "discrimination based
solely on nonpayment of debts would encourage reaffirmation con-
trary to the expressed polic[ies] of sections 525 and 524,111 the court
in Gibbs held that the antidiscrimination provisions applied to leas-
ing agreements and precluded eviction of a debtor solely for
nonrepayment of a discharged debt. 12 The court felt that the
Housing Authority's actions represented a clear example of the type
of discrimination prohibited by section 525, even though such ac-
tion was not specifically enumerated in the statute.1 13
D. The Examination of Circumstances Surrounding Bankruptcy,
Creditworthiness and Future Financial Responsibility
While section 525 has been broadly applied, the legislative his-
tory of that section clearly points out that Congress fully intended
to permit governmental organizations to inquire into a debtor's pro-
spective financial condition and examine the circumstances sur-
rounding a bankruptcy when deciding whether to grant certain
privileges to former bankrupts.114 In re Gahan illustrates such an
inquiry into the circumstances of a debtor's bankruptcy.115 In that
case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that section 525's prohi-
108. 9 Bankr. 758 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
109. Id. at 763.
110. Id. at 764.
111. Id. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interaction
between sections 524 and 525.
112. Gibbs, 9 Bankr. at 764.
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
115. 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1979). See also Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners (In re
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bition on discriminatory treatment does not prevent a bar associa-
tion from investigating the circumstances surrounding an
applicant's discharge of student loans in bankruptcy to determine
whether there was evidence of bad moral character.
1 16
In In re Richardson,117 the bankruptcy court was faced with a
factual situation similar to that in Goldrich. Richardson applied to
the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA)
for a student loan guarantee, but the PHEAA regulations prohib-
ited the agency from considering the application because an earlier
loan to Richardson had been discharged in bankruptcy." 8 Rich-
ardson sought declaratory and injunctive relief against PHEAA for
the anticipated denial of his loan application.
The bankruptcy court granted the requested relief against
PHEAA, holding that the agency's regulation violated the antidis-
crimination provisions of section 525. Relying on a construction of
section 525's legislative history adopted in Henry v. Heyison,119 the
court held that the PHEAA regulations were unconstitutional be-
cause they treated "a person who has had his student loan obliga-
G.W.L.), 364 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1978). See generally B. WEINTRAUB & R. RESNICK, supra note
90, § 3.06 at 3-23 to 3-24.
116. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a Board of Law Examiners' denial of
Gahan's bar application. Shortly after graduating from law school, Gahan filed a petition in
bankruptcy to discharge almost $14,000 in student loans. Although Gahan's actions fell
within the legal limits of the bankruptcy laws, the Board felt that his conduct evidenced bad
moral character, and that this provided sufficient grounds for denying him admission to the
bar.
117. 15 Bankr. 925 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd, 27 Bankr. 560 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
118. The PHEAA regulation at issue stated:
Eligibility for a loan guaranty shall be denied to any person who has allowed his
loan to mature through purchase from the lender by the Agency under the guaranty
of a previous loan in the Loan Guaranty Program, unless in the judgment of
Agency staff such loan should be guaranteed and one of the following has occurred:
(1) The defaulted loan has been repaid in full.
(2) An approved lending institution has purchased the outstanding balance of the
defaulted loan.
(3) The student has taken positive steps toward repayment of the loan or toward
supplying reasons in justification of the failure to repay....
Richardson, 15 Bankr. at 928 (quoting 22 Pa. Code § 121.4(b) (1981)). This section was
amended in 1981, but both versions were held unconstitutional by the lower court. Id at
929-30.
119. 4 Bankr. 437 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980). The Richardson court cited Heylson as stand-
ing for the proposition that:
The language of the Bankruptcy Code and the supporting House and Senate reports
make Congress' intent clear. Once a debt has been discharged under the Code a
state may not treat a debtor differently than a person who never incurred a debt.
Thus, although, a state could legitimately require financial responsibility insurance
for all its nonowner drivers, the Code prohibits it from treating those with judg-
ments discharged in bankruptcy differently from those who never had such debts.
Richardson, 15 Bankr. at 929 (quoting Heyison, 4 Bankr. at 442).
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tion discharged in bankruptcy different from a person who has
never incurred a student loan debt." 120
On appeal, the district court reversed. The court focused on the
fact that section 525 permits agencies such as PHEAA to "inquir[e]
into the future financial responsibility of a loan applicant... prior
to the extension of additional credit in the form of a guaranteed
student loan."'' The court found that a legitimate basis existed for
the denial of Richardson's application apart from his bankruptcy or
his failure to repay the discharged loan 122 and held that the
PHEAA had not discriminated against Richardson solely because
of his previous bankruptcy.
Section 525 has also been held to permit a state to impose uni-
form substantive financial responsibility requirements as a condition
precedent to the restoration of driving privileges suspended as a re-
sult of an individual's involvement in an automobile accident. In
Duffey v. Dollison,123 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Ohio's financial responsibility law was not preempted by the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Ohio's first Financial Responsibility Act had required
repayment of discharged tort debts prior to restoration of driving
privileges and was invalidated in Perez.124 The law upheld in Duf-
fey, however, required all judgment debtors to post proof of finan-
cial responsibility before their driving privileges are reinstated. 2
The Duffey court ruled that "bankruptcy [does] not relieve [a] judg-
ment debtor of the requirement of posting proof of future financial
responsibility." 126
The court's analysis focused on Congress' expression that "the
effect of... section [525], and of further interpretations of the Perez
rule, is to strengthen the anti-reaffirmation policy found in section
524(b)."' 127 Finding that the Ohio law did not require satisfaction
of a debt discharged in bankruptcy, the court felt that the state stat-
ute did not give creditors "leverage for the collection of dam-
120. Id. at 929. See also In re Goldrich, 45 Bankr. 514, 522 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984),
rev'd, 771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985) (discussing Richardson).
121. Richardson, 27 Bankr. at 564.
122. The court felt that there were sufficient independent grounds for rejecting Richard-
son's application. Following his departure from college in 1976, he made no payments on his
PHEAA loan and did not contact the lender about readjusting the repayment schedule.
Richardson also failed to give notice to the lending institution, thereby forfeiting a grace
period. Id at 565.
123. 734 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984).
124. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
125. OHito REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4509.31-.45 (Page 1982).
126. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 269.
127. Id. at 271. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
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ages." 128  The court noted that the Duffeys could not have
"regained their driving privileges without furnishing proof of finan-
cial responsibility even by reaffirming the judgments."' 129 Reason-
ing that Congress intended to permit the imposition of financial
responsibility requirements so long as they were not discriminato-
rily applied to bankrupts, the court felt that the statute did not treat
judgment debtors who resorted to bankruptcy any differently than
it treated other judgment debtors. 130
As Gahan, 13 Richardson,132 and Duffey 133 demonstrate, gov-
ernmental bodies may, in some situations, scrutinize certain factors
surrounding a bankruptcy, as well as a former bankrupt's financial
responsibility. They are forbidden from discriminating solely on
the grounds that an individual sought relief under the bankruptcy
laws.
V. THE SCOPE OF THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS
Some guiding principles can be drawn from Handsome,'34
Marine,135 Rose, 136 Gibbs,137 and Duffey.138 These cases vividly
demonstrate that application of the Bankruptcy Code's antidis-
crimination provisions is not always limited to situations which fall
within the plain language of the statute. For example, university
transcripts, public contracts, leases, and mortgage financing do not
fall within the literal language of section 525 but have been held to
be within the scope of the statute nonetheless. 39 In order to justify
their broad interpretation of the parameters of section 525, courts
have followed the reasoning set forth in Perez"4 and looked to the
effect of a particular state action to see if it frustrates the policies of
128. 734 F.2d at 272 (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 646). The court distinguished Ohio's
present Financial Responsibility Act from the one declared unconstitutional in Perez by stat-
ing, "[S]ince the present Ohio Act provides that a judgment stayed or discharged in bank-
ruptcy need not be satisfied by the judgment debtor as a condition to the restoration of
driving privileges, it clearly is consistent with the immediate holding in Perez." Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 273.
131. 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1979).
132. 15 Bankr. 925 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
133. 734 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984).
134. 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1978).
135. 17 Bankr. 845 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
136. 23 Bankr. 662 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982).
137. 9 Bankr. 758 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
138. 734 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984).
139. The literal language of section 525 restricts application of the antidiscrimination
provision to "licenses, permits, charters or franchises." See supra note 6.
140. See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
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the federal bankruptcy laws. While Congress did not intend that
debtors filing for bankruptcy escape all debts, it did intend that
debtors have a fresh start within the scope of the bankruptcy laws,
including the right to act without being under pressure to reaffirm
discharged debts. 41 While the state has an interest in collecting
student loans, placing government contracts in the hands of finan-
cially secure businesses, and ensuring payment of state-guaranteed
housing loans, these interests have not been permitted to impinge on
the fresh start policies of the Bankruptcy Code.
VI. GOLDRICH REVISITED
The effect of the Second Circuit's decision in Goldrich 142 is to
force a bankrupt who needs a loan guarantee to repay a debt he is
otherwise not required to pay under federal bankruptcy laws. The
fundamental flaw in the court's decision in Goldrich is the fact that
the court considered the purpose rather than the effect of the New
York law. The court upheld the law since the provision had what it
deemed to be a permissible state purpose, that of protecting "the
state coffers against repeated defaults." '143 Despite acknowledging
that section 525 was meant to codify the result of Perez,"4 the
Court in Goldrich 14 I appears to lose sight of that result.
The rule established in Perez was that a state may not pressure a
debtor into reaffirming a discharged debt or discriminate against a
debtor solely on the basis that he has previously discharged debts in
bankruptcy. A state may not frustrate operation of these rules
merely because it claims to have a legitimate purpose for doing
SO. 146
Under section 661(6)(b) of the New York Education Law, there
is no way for a debtor who has had his loans discharged in bank-
ruptcy to get new loans guaranteed until the old loans are repaid.1 47
While student loans are generally nondischargeable, 48 the New
York law clearly discriminates against those students with dis-
charged loans, since it denies them loan guarantees without any ef-
fort to investigate their current or prospective financial
141. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
142. 771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985).
143. Id. at 31.
144. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
145. 771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985).
146. I d; Perez, 402 U.S. at 651-52.
147. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
148. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1982 & Supp. If 1984).
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creditworthiness or the circumstances surrounding their bank-
ruptcy. This result contradicts the Supreme Court's declaration in
Perez that discrimination based soley on the debtor's status as a for-
mer bankrupt is not justified by an otherwise legitimate state pur-
pose.'49 The Code's antidiscrimination provisions do not purport to
guarantee that debtors will receive credit. Instead, the provisions
prohibit debtors from being denied consideration for credit solely
because they were once bankrupt. The "consideration of a past dis-
charge in determining whether to grant the debtor credit does not
violate the Code to the extent that the decision is made by a non-
governmental entity, or is based on purely economic criteria, such as
future financial responsibility. ", 150 Because the Code does not pre-
vent private credit sources from discriminating, i"1 former bank-
rupts in need of financing will often be forced to look to the state.
In Goldrich,152 a governmental agency was permitted to dis-
criminate against a bankrupt without any consideration of the for-
mer bankrupt's future financial responsibility simply because the
debtor had not repaid a discharged debt." 3 This action directly
conflicts with the rule established in Perez,154 as will any discrimina-
tion by governmental agencies when the determinations are not sup-
ported by economic criteria other than the simple fact of a former
bankruptcy.
VII. CONCLUSION
Nonconsideration for credit or financing can severely interfere
with a debtor's fresh start. For example, to refuse to even consider
a former bankrupt's application for credit, solely because five years
earlier he discharged a student loan in bankruptcy, is to completely
undercut the fresh start policies of the bankruptcy laws. Such ac-
tions do not give a debtor a "new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discourage-
ment of preexisting debt." '55 Instead, they render the debtor's op-
portunity for future economic vitality virtually nonexistant. This is
149. Perez, 402 U.S. at 652. In Perez, the otherwise legitimate state purpose was promot-
ing highway safety.
150. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 8, at 525-26 (emphasis added).
151. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
152. 771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985).
153. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
154. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
155. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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the unhappy result accepted in the Goldrich decision; it ought not
become its legacy.
SHARON L. KING

